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What Constitutes Exceptional?  
The Intersection of Circumstances Warranting 
Reopening of Removal Proceedings After Entry of an 
In Absentia Order of Removal and Due Process Rights 
of Noncitizens 
Rebecca Feldmann∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
According to data collected by the Department of Justice, 
Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”), in fiscal year 
2006, 39% of noncitizens failed to appear for their removal hearings1 
before an immigration judge.2 Although this was consistent with the 
rate from 2005, it had risen from a five-year low in 2003 of a rate of 
 
 ∗ J.D. (2008), Washington University School of Law. The author is indebted to 
Professor Stephen Legomsky for his review of and insightful comments on drafts of this Note.  
Any mistakes herein are the author’s own. 
 1. Prior to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996), “deportation” was the term 
of art referring to the procedure whereby a noncitizen illegally present in the United States was 
removed from the country, whereas “exclusion” referenced the procedure whereby a noncitizen 
was denied entry to the United States because he or she was inadmissible. Since April of 1996, 
both are now encompassed in “removal” proceedings. See, e.g., IIRIRA at 
§§ 308(d)(4)(B),(K),(O),(S),(T) and 308(e)(1). 
 2. OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, & TECHNOLOGY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR 
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2006 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK H2 (2007). 
Of a total of 280,494 decisions by immigration judges in such cases, 102,834 cases resulted in 
entry of an in absentia order of removal, while 6,879 resulted in administrative closure. Id. For 
non-detained noncitizens (i.e., those who have never been detained), the rate of failure to appear 
was 60%, while for released noncitizens (i.e., those who had previously been detained but were 
released on bond or on their own recognizance), the rate was 36% in 2006. Id. at H3-H4. While 
the failure to appear rates for non-detained noncitizens has, consistently with the overall rates, 
increased over the past five years, the rate for released noncitizens has steadily decreased for 
the five-year period FY 2002–2006. Id. 
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22%.3  Notably, however, the number of failures to appear decreased 
by 60% in 2007, to a five year low.4 
Since 1990, the Immigration and Nationality Act has contained 
provisions to treat more harshly those who fail to appear for these 
types of hearings.5 The harsher provisions were in part a response to a 
report by the General Accounting Office (“GAO”)6 in October 1989, 
which estimated that approximately 27% of noncitizens arriving in 
New York and Los Angeles who were suspected of being 
inadmissible failed to appear at their exclusion7 hearings.8 Pursuant to 
this report, Congress included in its draft and subsequent passage of 
the Immigration Act of 19909 controversial new provisions regarding 
noncitizens who failed to appear at their removal proceedings. 
Among these provisions was a subsection providing that any 
noncitizen who fails to attend a removal proceeding shall be ordered 
deported10 in absentia if the INS11 establishes by “clear, unequivocal, 
and convincing evidence” that written notice of the proceeding was 
properly provided to the noncitizen.12 This act also provides that such 
 
 3. FY 2006 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 2, at H2. This information does not, 
however, reflect reasons for such failure to appear (i.e., whether the failure to appear was due to 
oversight by the noncitizen or by a failure of DHS to send proper notice), nor the number of 
cases that were subsequently reopened due to one of the reasons listed in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”). See INA § 240(b)(5)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C).   
 4. OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, & TECHNOLOGY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR 
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2007, STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK H1 (2008). 
 5. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 545(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5061–65 
(1990). 
 6. Effective July 7, 2004, the GAO was officially renamed the Government 
Accountability Office. GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-271, 118 
Stat. 811 (2004); see also U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO’s Name Change and 
Other Provisions of the GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004, http://gao.gov/about/ 
namechange.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2007); David M. Walker, GAO Answers the Question: 
What’s In a Name?, ROLL CALL, July 19, 2004, available at http://gao.gov/about/ 
rollcall07192004.pdf.  
 7. See supra note 1. 
 8. GAO, IMMIGRATION CONTROL: DEPORTING AND EXCLUDING ALIENS FROM THE 
UNITED STATES (Oct. 1989).  
 9. Immigration Act of 1990, supra note 5, at § 545. 
 10. I.e., removed. See supra note 1. 
 11. With the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the INS ceased to exist and most of its 
functions were transferred to the newly created Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). 
See Homeland Security Act of 2002 §§ 101, 471, and 1502, Pub.L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 
2135, 2142, 2205, and 2308 (2002). 
 12. Immigration Act of 1990, supra note 5, at § 545(c)(1) and (2). 
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an order may be rescinded only upon a motion to reopen filed at any 
time if the noncitizen did not receive proper notice or was in custody 
at the time of the notice, or upon a motion to reopen filed within 180 
days after the date of the in absentia order if the noncitizen can 
demonstrate “exceptional circumstances.”13  
Since the enactment of this provision, the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) and the various circuit courts of appeals have 
varyingly interpreted “exceptional circumstances.”14 The circuits 
have occasionally determined that the BIA has abused its discretion 
in denying motions to reopen in absentia orders of removal based on 
exceptional circumstances.15 Certainly, the provisions of the INA 
regarding removal proceedings,16 particularly those regarding the 
process of rescinding in absentia orders of removal and thus 
reopening proceedings based upon exceptional circumstances,17 must 
be interpreted so as not to infringe upon constitutional rights.18 Such 
 
 13. Immigration Act of 1990, § 545(c)(3), supra note 5 (previously enacted at INA 
§ 242B(c)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(c)(3)). Subsections (c)(1)–(3) have remained largely intact in 
reforms of the INA through 2006, although these provisions have subsequently been enacted at 
INA §240(a). See IIRIRA, supra note 1, § 308(b)(6). Provisions to address removal 
proceedings for noncitizens issued a Notice to Appear on or after April 1, 1997 were added by 
§ 304(a)(3) of IIRIRA, 110 Stat. 589, which created section 240 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a 
(2006). 
 14. See infra Part II.B. 
 15. Under the applicable standard, a judicial court may review discretionary 
determinations of the BIA if such determination was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). See also Hang v. INS, 360 F.2d 
715, 719 (2d Cir. 1966); Ogbemudia v. INS, 988 F.2d 595, 600 (5th Cir. 1993); INS v. Doherty, 
502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992); Sharma v. INS, 89 F.3d 545, 547 (9th Cir. 1996).  
 16. INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006). 
 17. INA § 240(b)(5)(A)–(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A)–(C)(i) (2006); see also INA 
§ 240(b)(5)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). 
 18. See Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895) (“The elementary rule is that 
every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from 
unconstitutionality . . . . The courts will therefore not lightly assume that Congress intended to 
infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power constitutionally forbidden it.”). See 
also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299–300 (2001) (citing Edward J. Debartolo Corp. v. Florida 
Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); NLRB v. Catholic 
Bishop of Chicago 440 U.S. 490, 499–501 (1979); Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749–50 
(1961)). 
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an interpretation must and would be consistent with congressional 
intent in enacting the INA.19 
The right to a full and fair hearing, in compliance with the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution,20 has repeatedly been 
held to extend to noncitizens in removal proceedings.21 This 
extension is justified both by text and by policy. First, the language of 
the amendment applies to all “person[s],” rather than simply to 
 
 19. Thus, under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
the circuits cannot avoid the constitutional question at stake here. Under Chevron analysis, the 
court must answer two questions: 
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the 
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the 
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the 
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. 
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the 
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute. 
Id. at 842–43. For an example of the Supreme Court’s application of Chevron deference to a 
case involving the BIA, see INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999). However, cf. INS v. 
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).  
 It is well-established that in motions to reopen in absentia orders of removal, the circuit 
courts will review the decision of the BIA for abuse of discretion. See infra notes 50–51 and 
accompanying text. Additionally, under the avoidance canon, statutes should be construed in 
such a way as to avoid constitutional doubts. Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. 
CT. REV. 47, 76 (2004) (citing Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957)); Clark v. Martinez, 
543 U.S. 371, 379 (2005). This is a “tool for choosing between competing plausible 
interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not 
intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts.” Clark, 543 U.S. at 381–82 
(citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991)), Edward J. Debartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf 
Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). As the Court explained in 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001):  
[T]he rule does not permit courts to press statutory construction to the point of 
disingenuous evasion even to avoid a constitutional question. . . . An interpretation 
which defeats the stated congressional purpose does not suffice to invoke the 
constitutional doubt rule, for it is “plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” 
Id. at 707. 
 20. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law.”). 
 21. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); Matter of Exilus, 18 I&N Dec. 
276, 278 (B.I.A. 1982). See also Dobrota v. INS, 311 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Aliens 
facing deportation are entitled to due process under the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, encompassing a full and fair hearing and notice of that hearing.”); Farhoud v. INS, 
122 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 1997); Andia v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2004).  
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citizens.22 Furthermore, once a noncitizen gains admission and begins 
to develop the ties that go with permanent residence, his 
constitutional status changes accordingly, as compared to a 
noncitizen seeking initial admission.23 Thus, when a noncitizen 
misses an immigration hearing due to exceptional circumstances, due 
process concerns, such as the right to notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard,24 are implicated.25  
In immigration proceedings, as in other types of administrative 
proceedings, the test to be followed to determine what process rights 
are due is that established in Mathews v. Eldridge.26 The Matthews 
test weighs the interest at stake for the individual, the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used 
and the probable value, if any, of additional or different procedural 
safeguards, and the interest of the government in using the current 
procedures rather than additional or different procedures.27 The role 
of the courts of appeal, as the judicial reviewers of decisions of the 
BIA,28 “is limited to determining whether the procedures meet the 
essential standard of fairness under the Due Process Clause and does 
not extend to imposing procedures that merely displace congressional 
choices of policy.”29 
 
 22. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 23. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 
763, 770 (1950); United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131, 133–34 (1924); Low Wah 
Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 468 (1912)). 
 24.  
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which 
is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, 
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 
opportunity to present their objections. . . . The notice must be of such nature as 
reasonably to convey the required information. 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
 25. Kaweesa v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 62, 69 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Nazarova v. INS, 171 
F.3d 478, 482 (7th Cir. 1999)). 
 26. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 27. Id. See also Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34; Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917, 
927 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The liberty interests involved in removal proceedings are of the highest 
order. Removal visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay 
and live and work in this land of freedom.”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). 
 28. See INA § 242(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (2000).  
 29. Landon, 459 U.S. at 34–35. (1982); see also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. 
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This Note aims at a better understanding of the best understanding 
of “exceptional circumstances” in light of the decisions of the circuit 
courts, which are limited to reviewing agency decisions for abuse of 
discretion,30 as compared to those of the BIA. Part II examines the 
history of removal proceedings in the context of failures to appear 
due to exceptional circumstances, as well as the interpretation of the 
requirements under INA § 240(b)(5)(C)31 for reopening by the BIA 
and circuits. It also turns to the role of procedural due process in such 
decisions. Part III analyzes two types of exceptional circumstances 
under the framework articulated by the BIA and circuits, and 
examines where due process does and should intersect in such claims. 
Part IV suggests “exceptional circumstances” should be interpreted as 
circumstances beyond a person’s control, as clearly established by the 
totality of the circumstances. This section further argues that such an 
interpretation would work at the administrative level to ensure that 
due process rights of noncitizens are not violated when the BIA has 
to make a decision on whether to reopen proceedings on this ground. 
It also addresses potential counterarguments against such an 
interpretation. Finally, Part V concludes that only by closely 
examining the right of noncitizens to a full and fair hearing in this 
unique form of removal proceedings will the BIA be able to come to 
a uniform interpretation of exceptional circumstances warranting 
reopening of cases involving in absentia orders of removal, one that 
is consistent with congressional intent in enacting these provisions of 
the INA, thus limiting the need for review of these decisions by the 
federal courts of appeals. 
 
Natural Res., 435 U.S. 519, 524–25 (1978) (finding that administrative agencies will be in a 
better position than Congress or the courts to design procedural rules adapted to the tasks of the 
agency involved and to the peculiarities of its area of expertise). 
 30. See supra notes 14, 18. But compare INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298–99 (2001), 
which argues that the INS must overcome “the strong presumption in favor of judicial review of 
administrative action” in order to prevail. See also Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family 
Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986); McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc, 498 U.S. 479, 
498 (1991); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 
373–74 (1974). 
 31. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C) (2000). 
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II. FROM THE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1990 INTO THE 21ST CENTURY: 
INTERPRETATION OF “EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES” BY THE BIA 
AND CIRCUIT COURTS 
The primary problem with the “exceptional circumstances” 
provision as a reason to reopen removal proceedings closed in 
absentia has been the lack of consistent interpretative standards 
articulated by the BIA, primarily, or the circuit courts, as reviewers of 
the BIA’s decisions. It is first necessary to understand the statutory 
provisions regarding removal proceedings when the noncitizen fails 
to appear. Thereafter, an examination of the decisions in which the 
BIA and circuits have examined exceptional circumstances will 
illuminate the problem of inconsistency that shrouds the process of 
reopening orders of removal entered in absentia.  
A. Consequences of Failure to Appear and Motions to Reopen in 
Absentia Orders of Removal Under INA § 240 
If the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) becomes aware 
that a noncitizen is deportable for any reason,32 it will issue to the 
noncitizen a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), which officially commences 
removal proceedings. The NTA advises the respondent noncitizen of 
his or her duties and of the consequences of failing to appear at the 
removal proceedings.33 Should the noncitizen fail to appear at any 
subsequent hearing, provided adequate notice34 has been given either 
 
 32. For a detailed list of the various deportability grounds, see INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227 (2006). For the list of grounds of inadmissibility, see INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 
(2006). 
 33. See INA § 239(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (2006). The notice to appear further 
requires the noncitizen to inform DHS of any changes in address or telephone number. Id. 
§ 239(a)(1)(F).  
 34. The INA provisions regarding adequate notice in this regard changed significantly 
with the enactment of IRRIRA. The Immigration Act of 1990 added the following notice 
provision to the INA:  
 Sec. 242B (a) Notices.— 
(1) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE.—In deportation proceedings under section 242, written 
notice (in this section referred to as an ‘order to show cause’) shall be given in person 
to the alien (or, if personal service is not practicable, such notice shall be given by 
certified mail to the alien or to the alien’s counsel of record, if any. . . . 
(Emphasis added). Thus, notice was adequate only if the noncitizen was personally served or 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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to the noncitizen or his or her attorney of record,35 he or she “shall be 
ordered removed in absentia” so long as the DHS establishes “by 
clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence” that such notice was 
provided and that the noncitizen is removable.36 
 
the notice was delivered to the noncitizen or his attorney of record by certified mail. However, 
according to IIRIRA’s notice provision: 
Sec. 239. (a) Notice to Appear.— 
 (1) IN GENERAL.—In removal proceedings under section 240, written notice (in this 
section referred to as a ‘notice to appear’) shall be given in person to the alien (or, if 
personal service is not practicable, through service by mail to the alien or to the alien’s 
counsel of record, if any) . . . . 
IIRIRA, supra note 1, § 304 (emphasis added). Some courts have interpreted this more lax 
notice requirement to lessen the formerly “strong presumption” of receipt. Compare Matter of 
Grijalva, 21 I.&N. Dec. 27, 37 (B.I.A. 1995) (holding that the “strong presumption” of effective 
service may only be overcome by “substantial and probative evidence such as documentary 
evidence from the Postal Service, third party affidavits, or other similar evidence demonstrating 
that there was improper delivery or that nondelivery was not due to the respondent’s failure to 
provide an address where he could receive mail”) to Salta v. INS, 314 F.3d 1076, 1079 (2002) 
(concluding BIA abused its discretion in applying the “strong presumption of effective service” 
because “delivery by regular mail does not raise the same ‘strong presumption’ as certified 
mail, and less should be required to rebut such a presumption”).  
 35. Adequate notice may be provided to the noncitizen pursuant to either paragraph (1) or 
(2) of INA § 239(a) discussed infra notes 41–42. Paragraph (2) of that section provides: 
(2) Notice of change in time or place of proceedings 
In general 
In removal proceedings under section 240(b)(5) . . . , in the case of any change or 
postponement in the time and place of such proceedings, subject to subparagraph (B) a 
written notice shall be given in person to the alien(or, if personal service is not 
practicable, through service by mail to the alien or to the alien’s counsel of record, if 
any) specifying— 
(i) the new time or place of the proceedings, and 
(ii) the consequences under section 240(b)(5) . . . of failing, except under exceptional 
circumstances, to attend such proceedings. 
Exception 
In the case of an alien not in detention, a  
written notice shall not be required under this paragraph if the alien has failed to 
provide the address required under paragraph (1)(F) 
Id.  
 36. INA § 240(b)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A) (2005). To be sufficient, DHS need 
only provide written notice to the most recent address under section 239(a)(1)(F). Id. 
§ 239(b)(5)(A),(B). 
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Since 1990, the INA has taken into account the fact that 
circumstances beyond the control of the noncitizen may cause some 
noncitizens to miss their removal proceedings.37 As such, INA § 
240(b)(5)(C)(i) provides that an order of removal entered in the 
noncitizen’s absence may be rescinded upon a motion to reopen 
“filed within 180 days after the date of the order of removal if the 
alien demonstrates that the failure to appear was because of 
exceptional circumstances.”38 The motion to reopen is the means 
used to present material new facts which were “not available and 
could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”39 
The Act further defines exceptional circumstances as those 
“circumstances (such as serious illness of the alien or serious illness 
or death of the spouse, child, or parent of the alien, but not including 
less compelling circumstances) beyond the control of the alien.”40  
Additionally, the Immigration Judge Benchbook (“Benchbook”) 
provides some guidance in interpreting “exceptional circumstances” 
 
 37. See Immigration Act of 1990, § 545(c), enacted as INA § 242B(c), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252B(c) (1990). This section was later reenacted as INA § 240(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5) 
(2005). These sections are substantially the same, except compare Immigration Act of 1990, 
§ 545(c)(4) to current INA § 240(b)(5)(D)(iii). 
 38. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i) (2005). Paragraph (ii) of § 1229a(b)(5)(C) further 
provides for motions to reopen filed at any time if the noncitizen demonstrates either that 
sufficient notice was not provided or that the noncitizen “was in Federal or State custody and 
the failure to appear was through no fault of the alien.” This paragraph, however, is beyond the 
scope of this note, except to observe the similarity of the latter part of this paragraph (failure to 
appear “through no fault of the alien”) to the definition of exceptional circumstances as 
“beyond the control of the alien.” See, INA § 240(e)(1). Such similarity would seem to indicate 
a similar concern in both provisions authorizing reopening of removal proceedings previously 
concluded with an in absentia order of removal. 
 39. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2005). Such a motion is distinct from a motion to reconsider, 
which is filed for the purpose of calling attention to “errors of fact or law in the prior Board 
decision” and thus must “be supported by pertinent authority.” Id. § 1003.2(b)(1). Motions to 
reopen under this section of the INA are to contain “the new facts that will be proven at a 
hearing to be held if the motion is granted, and shall be supported by affidavits or other 
evidentiary material.” INA § 240(c)(6)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B). 
 A series of measures in recent years, including the Immigration Act of 1990 and IIRIRA, 
have imposed major procedural restrictions on the filing of motions to reopen. The noncitizen 
may file only one motion to reopen a removal order, and if exceptional circumstances have not 
been demonstrated, that motion must be filed within 90 days of the final order of removal (with 
the exception of certain asylum cases). See INA § 240(c)(6)(A),(B), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(c)(6)(A),(B); INA § 240(c)(7)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(C)(7)(A); INA 
§ 240(c)(7)(C)(i),(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i),(ii).  
 40. INA § 240(e)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(1) (2005). See also infra notes 41–42 and 
accompanying text. 
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in motions to reopen.41 According to its discussion of motions to 
reopen,  
A motion to rescind an in absentia order of deportation in 
exclusion proceedings shall be denied unless the alien provides 
a reasonable explanation for his or her failure to appear. See 
Matter of S-A-, 21 I&N Dec. 1050 (BIA 1998) (holding that 
traffic is not a reasonable cause to warrant the reopening of 
exclusion proceedings).42  
While the Benchbook mentions “exceptional circumstances,” it 
does not expand on the meaning of that term much beyond that which 
is provided in the Statute.43 Although limited in its interpretation of 
when exceptional circumstances warrant reopening, the Benchbook 
does, however, give examples of when exceptional circumstances do 
not exist, explaining, for instance, when ineffective assistance of 
counsel does not qualify as an exceptional circumstance justifying 
reopening.44 
 
 41. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW 
(“EOIR”), IMM. JDG. BNCHBK. (2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/benchbook.pdf. 
 42. Id. at 8.II.B.25; see also supra note 1. 
 43. IMM. JDG. BNCHBK., supra note 41, at 8.II.B.29. The only expansion of the INA’s 
definition given in the Benchbook allows for exceptional circumstances in cases involving 
ineffective assistance of counsel: 
The term “exceptional circumstances” refers to exceptional circumstances (such as 
serious illness of the alien or serious illness or death of the alien’s spouse, child or 
parent, but not including less compelling circumstances) beyond the control of the 
alien. INA § 240(e)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 3.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)(1) (2000). The ineffective 
assistance of counsel constitutes “exceptional circumstances” excusing the failure to 
appear. Matter of Grijalva, 21 I&N Dec. 472 (B.I.A. 1996). Immigration Judge’s [sic] 
should ALWAYS read and issue all warnings, advisals, dates for applications as well 
as the penalties that apply should applications not be timely filed directly to the alien 
through an interpreter so that there is no question in the mind of the alien what must be 
done in his or her case. This eliminates many “ineffective assistance” issues that may 
otherwise result in remands. 
Id. See also Matter of Gustavo Alonzo Grijalva-Barrera, 21 I.&N. Dec. 472 (B.I.A. 1996) 
(ineffective assistance of counsel warranted reopening). The requirements for a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel to be examined by the Immigration Judge when ruling on a 
motion to reopen are set out in Matter of Lozada, 19 I.&N. Dec. 537, Interim Decision 3059 
(B.I.A. 1988).  
 44. These provisions provide: 
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B. Administrative and Judicial Interpretation of “Exceptional 
Circumstances” 
To date, the BIA and the circuits appear to have recognized three 
primary areas of contention regarding claims of exceptional 
circumstances.45 The first type of claims revolve around the meaning 
of “serious illness” as would warrant reopening under the INA.46 The 
second group of claims involves ineffective assistance of counsel,47 
and the third group consists of claims involving tardiness to removal 
hearings.48 Contrary to what might be expected, the extent to which 
the reason for the tardiness was beyond the control of the noncitizen 
is not necessarily a major consideration taken into account by the 
BIA or the circuit courts.49 In all categories, however, the courts 
 
a. An alien seeking to reopen in absentia proceedings based on his or her unsuccessful 
communications with his or her attorney did not establish exceptional circumstances 
pursuant to section 242B(c)(3)(A) of the Act when she failed to satisfy all of the 
requirements for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as set out in Matter of 
Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1988). Matter of Rivera-Claros, 21 I&N Dec. 599 
(B.I.A. 1996); cf. also Matter of A-A-, Interim Decision 3357 (B.I.A. 1998) (a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel does not constitute an exception to the 180-day 
statutory limit for the filing of a motion to reopen to rescind an in absentia order of 
deportation on the basis of exceptional circumstances); Matter of Lei, Interim Decision 
3356 (B.I.A. 1998) (same). 
b. An alien’s failure to appear at his or her rescheduled deportation hearing due to his 
inability to leave his or her employment on a fishing vessel was not an “exceptional 
circumstance.” Matter of W-F-, 21 I&N Dec. 503 (B.I.A. 1996). 
Id. at 8.II.B.29.a, b. 
 45. Certainly there are cases that do not fall squarely into any three of these categories or 
for which there may be overlap between several of the categories; see, e.g., Matter of Chaman 
Singh, No. A72567465 2004 WL 3187212 (B.I.A. 2004) (no exceptional circumstances where 
in absentia order was entered while respondent was waiting outside courtroom for attorney to 
appear and respondent had not previously been to such a hearing); Chete Juarez v. Ashcroft, 
376 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2004) (BIA abused its discretion in determining that there were no 
exceptional circumstances where noncitizen did not receive notice of hearing because of change 
in address, misunderstanding of time of hearing could constitute exceptional circumstances). 
However, for purposes of defining a standard by which the BIA should properly interpret 
“exceptional circumstances” so as not to violate due process rights of noncitizens, it is 
necessary to examine these three classes, on which the BIA and the courts of appeals have had 
numerous occasions to rule. 
 46. See Matter of Singh, 21 I.&N. Dec. 998 (B.I.A. 1997) (family illness causing 
respondent to be 15 minutes late constituted exceptional hardship). See also infra notes 54–55. 
 47. See also infra notes 56–60 and accompanying text. 
 48. See infra notes 73–74.  
 49. See infra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. 
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examine the legal determinations of the BIA de novo, subject to 
principles of administrative deference.50 The BIA’s ultimate decision 
to deny a motion to reopen is reviewed by the courts for abuse of 
discretion.51  
Generally, one area in which the BIA and circuit courts have been 
in agreement has been in their unwillingness to find exceptional 
circumstances where the noncitizen is late to his or her hearing due to 
traffic problems.52 However, at least one court has found that traffic 
problems in combination with other factors may allow the noncitizen 
to reopen based on exceptional circumstances.53 
The first category of in absentia orders of removal, serious illness 
of the noncitizen or immediate relative,54 is contained in the statute 
and has been applied strictly by the BIA and the courts.55 
 
 50. See, e.g., De Massenet v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 661, 663 (1st Cir. 2007); see also supra 
note 19. 
 51. De Massenet, supra note 50; see also Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83 (2d 
Cir. 2001); Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 2002); Stewart v. U.S. I.N.S., 181 F.3d 
587 (4th Cir. 1999); Aneyoue v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 2007); Iturribarria v. I.N.S., 
321 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003); Assa’ad v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 332 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 52. See Matter of S-A-, 21 I.&N. Dec. 1050 (B.I.A. 1997) (traffic problem causing 
noncitizen to be half an hour late is not exceptional circumstance); Sharma v. INS, 89 F.3d 545 
(9th Cir. 1996); Doering v. INS, 172 F.3d 56 (9th Cir. 1999) (where noncitizen was a long-time 
Los Angeles resident and allowed only thirty-five minutes travel time during rush hour to get to 
his hearing in downtown Los Angeles, heavy traffic due to an auto accident causing him to 
arrive forty-five minutes late did not constitute exceptional circumstances). 
 53. See Herbert v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2003). There, the court held that where 
the noncitizen was delayed due to traffic congestion and where the noncitizen’s counsel of 
record failed to appear at the hearing, exceptional circumstances warranted reopening. The 
court also found it persuasive that the noncitizen clearly intended to appear, and took into 
account the fact that the noncitizen had appeared at all prior hearings in making its 
determination. Id. at 72–73. 
 54. In an unpublished decision issued in 2003, the BIA overturned a decision by an 
immigration judge who had found that the respondent’s claim of needing to take care of his 
mother in Nigeria who was suffering from breast cancer (a claim that was uncontested by DHS) 
did not constitute exceptional circumstances. Vacating the IJ’s decision, the BIA determined 
that his mother’s cancer was “certainly a matter beyond his control” that warranted reopening 
based on exceptional circumstances excusing his failure to appear. The Board also noted that 
the IJ erred in requiring the respondent to have notified the immigration court ahead of time of 
this circumstance, explaining that while this may have been the “courteous” thing to do, “such 
courtesy is not always possible or practicable, as in this case.” Matter of Alphonsus Mary 
Obiora Gusiora, No. A23464590, 2003 WL 23508564 (B.I.A. Dec. 23, 2003). See also 
Unpublished B.I.A. Opinion Considers ‘Exceptional Circumstances’ and In Absentia Removal, 
81 Interpreter Releases 214 (Feb. 16, 2004)). 
 55. See, e.g., Valle v. Gonzales, 138 Fed. App. 979 (9th Cir. 2005) (unsigned note from 
medical clinic and noncitizen’s affidavit failed to establish serious illness sufficient to warrant 
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The second category, dealing with ineffective assistance of 
counsel, is one regularly applied by both the BIA and the circuit 
courts, despite the lack of specific reference to this type of claim in 
the INA. Claims based on ineffective assistance of counsel typically 
rely on Matter of Lozada, 19 I.& N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988) to 
determine when such cases rise to the level of exceptional 
circumstances.56 Lozada held that a noncitizen filing a motion to 
reopen removal proceedings based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel must (1) submit an affidavit setting forth in detail the 
agreement that was entered into with his or her counsel with respect 
to the actions to be taken and what representations counsel did or did 
not make to the respondent in this regard, (2) inform the counsel 
 
reopening in absentia order of removal); Morales v. Ashcroft, 103 Fed. App. 169 (9th cir. 2004) 
(exceptional circumstances excusing failure to appear existed where alien submitted affidavit 
explaining that she went to the hospital the night before the hearing because of difficulty 
breathing, that she left the hospital mid-morning the day of the removal hearing, and that 
doctors prescribed valium and told her not to drive and get bed rest and where alien also 
submitted a medical form from the hospital dated the day of the hearing). See also Matter of B-
A-S-, 22 I.&N. Dec. 57 (B.I.A. 1998) (holding that a foot injury suffered by respondent day 
before and day of his hearing did not constitute exceptional circumstance where he did not 
support his claim with medical records or an affidavit from his employer); Matter of J-P-, 22 
I.&N. Dec. 33 (B.I.A. 1998) (finding that a serious headache suffered by the respondent on the 
day of his hearing was not an exceptional circumstance justifying his failure to appear, where 
he the only evidence supporting his claim was an affidavit he had written as to his symptoms). 
But cf. Matter of J-P-, 22 I.&N. Dec. at 36–48 (Rosenberg, J., dissenting) (noting that in certain 
circumstances a serious headache may constitute exceptional circumstances; pointing out new 
standard articulated by majority suggesting three additional requirements: corroboration, 
medical opinion, and a diligence requirement whereby the noncitizen should call to notify the 
immigration court of these circumstances; finding that remand is only appropriate means of 
providing fundamental fairness to noncitizen to address these three new requirements); Matter 
of B-A-S-, 22 I.&N. Dec. at 60–66 (Rosenberg, J., dissenting). 
 56. See, e.g., Dakane v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 371 F.3d 771, 775 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining a 
petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show “substantial, if not exact, 
compliance with the procedural requirements of Lozada[]); Hamid v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 465, 
469 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Sound policy reasons support compliance with the Lozada 
requirements.”); Stroe v. INS, 256 F.3d 498, 503–04 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim because the petitioner did not comply with the Lozada 
requirements); Lara v. Trominski, 216 F.3d 487, 498 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he general application 
of the Lozada rules is not an abuse of discretion.”); Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 525 
(9th Cir. 2000) Bernal-Vallejo v. INS, 195 F.3d 56, 64 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing the Lozada 
requirements as supporting dismissal of ineffective assistance claim); Stewart v. INS, 181 F.3d 
587, 596 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that since petitioner “failed to assert her claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel to the BIA in the manner prescribed by Matter of Lozada . . . [the] Court 
[could not] consider the claim”); In re Assaad, 23 I.&N. Dec. 553 (B.I.A. 2003) (in banc) 
(reaffirming the continuing validity of the Lozada requirements). 
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whose integrity or competence is being impugned of the allegations 
leveled against him or her so that counsel is provided an opportunity 
to respond, and (3) either establish that a complaint has been filed 
with the appropriate bar association or other disciplinary authorities 
for such ineffective assistance, or explain why such action has not 
been taken.57  
Courts vary on their willingness to reopen such cases, particularly 
where the noncitizen has failed to meet the last of these enumerated 
factors.58 Some circuits have explained that the requirements 
enumerated in Lozada were merely factors to be considered,59 and at 
least one circuit has held that the application of Lozada to bar a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel was “arbitrary and an abuse of the 
IJ’s discretion.”60 
As to the third category of exceptional circumstances claims 
(tardiness), the BIA and the circuits reviewing these decisions have 
yet to reach a uniform standard.61 The circuits seem more willing to 
take into account the reasons for the tardiness and the amount of time 
 
 57. Matter of Lozada, 19 I.&N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1988). 
 58. See also INA § 242B(c)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(c)(3)(A); Jobe v. INS, 212 F.3d 674 
(1st Cir. 2000) (doctrine of equitable tolling creates an exception to the 180-day period for 
seeking rescission of an in absentia order of removal based on exceptional circumstances if 
failure to timely file was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel). 
 59. Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 526 (9th Cir. 2000) (“While the requirements of 
Lozada are generally reasonable, they need not be rigidly enforced where their purpose is fully 
served by other means.”). 
 60. Twum v. INS, 411 F.3d 54, 56 (2d. Cir. 2005). 
 61. Compare Matter of Singh, 21 I&N Dec. 998 (B.I.A. 1997) (holding that slight 
tardiness due to family illness can constitute exceptional circumstance) to Pineda v. U.S. Att’y 
Gen., 186 Fed. App. 854, 856 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that arrival approximately fifteen 
minutes after hearing was scheduled due to confusion about the location of the hearing was not 
exceptional circumstance because not “of the same type as the events discussed in the INA”); 
see also Herbert v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 68, 69–70 (1st Cir. 2003) (reversing BIA denial of 
motion to reopen decision in absentia where respondent arrived approximately thirty minutes 
late and in light of “other unusual circumstances” including his counsel’s filing of an 
emergency motion for continuance explaining that respondent had been ordered to appear 
before a magistrate judge continued from the preceding day); Nazarova v. INS, 171 F.3d 478 
(7th Cir. 1999) (finding that two hour tardiness was an exceptional circumstance warranting 
reopening where respondent was waiting for an interpreter that the court had told her would be 
provided); Matter of Chaman Singh, No. A72567465 2004 WL 3187212 (B.I.A. 2004) 
(determining that exceptional circumstances warranting reopening did not exist where 
respondent arrived on time but waited outside the courtroom for an hour for his attorney to 
arrive, during which time an in absentia order of removal was entered against him). 
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elapsed between the time the hearing was scheduled and the time the 
noncitizen arrived.62 
Beginning with Matter of W-F- and in a number of subsequent 
cases,63 the BIA has asserted a “totality of the circumstances” 
approach to interpreting “exceptional circumstances.”64 However, the 
BIA has not uniformly applied this test, and in some cases it has been 
up to the courts of appeal to reiterate this standard to the BIA for 
consideration on remand. Furthermore, the BIA and the courts of 
appeals have articulated various factors to be considered in 
evaluating the total circumstances. According to the BIA, such 
factors as supporting documentary evidence, the noncitizen’s efforts 
in contacting the immigration court, and the noncitizen’s promptness 
in filing the motion to reopen may be significant.65 The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals has added factors to this list, including the strength 
of the noncitizen’s underlying claim, the harm the noncitizen would 
suffer if the motion to reopen is denied, and the inconvenience the 
government would suffer if the motion were granted.66 
 
 62. Many instances of tardiness involve cases where the noncitizen was delayed due to 
traffic and thus exceptional circumstances usually are not found. However, in certain cases the 
courts of appeals have distinguished cases of shorter delays as not constituting failure to attend 
a hearing, and thus warranting reopening. See, e.g., Alarcon-Chavez v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 343 
(5th Cir. 2005) (arriving 20 minutes late did not constitute failure to attend hearing so as to 
support an in absentia order) Cabrera-Perez v. Gonzales, 456 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(immigration judge deprived noncitizen of due process by issuing in absentia order, when 
noncitizen was merely late and thus did not fail to appear nor was required to demonstrate 
exceptional circumstances). See also Jerezano v. INS, 169 F.3d 613 (9th Cir. 1999) (granting 
motion to reopen where court found that the immigration judge had deprived the noncitizen of 
his due process rights where he arrived in the courtroom approximately fifteen minutes past the 
scheduled time of hearing while the judge was still on the bench).  
 63. See, e.g. Matter of M-S-, 22 I.&N. Dec. 349 (B.I.A. 1998); Matter of Lei, 22 I.&N. 
Dec. 113, 119 (B.I.A. 1998); Matter of J-P-, 22 I.&N. Dec. 33, 36 (B.I.A. 1998); Matter of S-
M-, 22 I.&N. Dec. 49, 50 (B.I.A. 1998). 
 64. Matter of W-F-, 21 I.&N. Dec. 503 (B.I.A. 1996). In setting forth this standard, the 
BIA looked to the House Conference report for the Immigration Act of 1990, discussed infra 
notes 84–85 and accompanying text. In that particular case, the BIA found that “the 
respondent’s situation has not been shown to be ‘exceptional,’ unforeseeable, or in any way 
beyond his control,” and held that the respondent’s failure to appear because he was on a 
fishing vessel for employment purposes did not constitute “exceptional circumstances.” Id. at 
509. 
 65. Matter of B-A-S-, 22 I.&N. Dec 57, 58–59 (B.I.A. 1998). 
 66. Kaweesa v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 62, 68–69 (1st Cir. 2006); see also Singh v. INS, 295 
F.3d 1037, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit also stated in Singh that if a respondent 
has no possible reason to try to delay the hearing and denying a motion to reopen would lead to 
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C. Due Process Rights of Noncitizens in Removal Proceedings 
To protect due process, federal immigration regulations should not 
be so strictly interpreted as to provide unreasonable, unfair, or absurd 
results.67 Furthermore, whenever an alien misses any immigration 
hearing due to either lack of notice or exceptional circumstances, due 
process concerns, including the right to notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard, are implicated.68 
The U.S. Supreme Court has established that removal involves a 
loss of liberty such that due process must be provided before an alien 
is deported.69 At a minimum, due process requires that such a 
deprivation of liberty be preceded by notice and an opportunity for 
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.70 As mentioned above,71 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Mathews v. Eldridge72 articulated 
three factors to be considered in deciding what procedures are 
required when there has been a deprivation of liberty, including the 
private interest that will be affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation 
of that interest and the probable value of additional procedural 
safeguards, and the Government’s interest.73 
III. USING DUE PROCESS AS A GUIDE TO INTERPRETING 
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
What exactly is meant by “exceptional circumstances” justifying 
rescission of in absentia orders of removal and thus reopening of 
removal proceedings is not immediately clear from the face of the 
 
the “unconscionable result” of deporting an individual who is eligible for relief, the totality of 
the circumstances approach suggests that exceptional circumstances may exist. Id. at 1040. 
 67. Chowdhury v. INS, 241 F.3d 848, 853 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 68. Kaweesa, 450 F.3d at 69; see also Nazarova, 171 F.3d at 482. 
 69. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 
(1950). 
 70. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Richards v. 
Jefferson County, Alabama, 517 U.S. 793 (1996) (holding that the opportunity to be heard is 
essential to due process). 
 71. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
 72. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 73. Id. at 335. Determination of the Government’s interest includes an evaluation of “the 
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail.” Id. 
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statute, nor have the BIA’s decisions always provided clear-cut 
interpretation.74 While Congress left some guidance as to the 
interpretation of various enforcement provisions in the House 
Conference Report accompanying the Immigration Act of 1990,75 
many of the key terms remain ambiguous. The proper interpretation, 
one that does not violate the due process rights of noncitizens in cases 
which should be reopened, must be determined by analyzing 
decisions of both the BIA and the various courts of appeals reviewing 
the BIA’s decisions. 
The statutory “definition” of exceptional circumstances76 sheds 
little (if any) light as to how to interpret this term. Properly read, INA 
§ 240(e)(1) defines exceptional circumstances as “exceptional 
circumstances . . . beyond the control of the alien”.77 It also 
parenthetically and perfunctorily gives examples that may qualify, 
 
 74. However, see Iris Gomez, The Consequences of Nonappearance: Interpreting New 
Section 242B of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 75 (1993) for a 
very thoughtful analysis and statutory construction of the exception as originally enacted. 
Gomez concedes that the term “exceptional circumstances” is ambiguous. Id. at 143. Even after 
looking to the definition set out in BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 560 (6th ed. 1990) (“Conditions 
which are out of the ordinary course of events; unusual or extraordinary circumstances. For 
example, lack of jurisdiction to hear and determine a case constitutes ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ as a basis for raising a question for the first time on a habeas corpus.”), she 
determines that the phrase is “not susceptible to ready classification.” Id. at 144. She further 
carefully examines the statutory parameters of the definition of exceptional circumstances as 
both enlarging and limiting the situations to which the term may be applied. Id. at 144–45. 
Further, Gomez analyzes the relationship of “exceptional circumstances” to “reasonable 
opportunity to appear” and “reasonable cause” under then INA Section 242(b). Id. at 146–58. 
She concludes that at least as of 1993, agency rulemaking had “yet to close major gaps or 
clarify many significant interpretive questions Congress left untouched.” Id. at 158. 
 75. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 101-955 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6784, 6797. 
According to that report, the Act includes “several enforcement provisions” designed, in part, to 
ensure that aliens properly notified of impending deportation proceedings, or other 
proceedings, in fact appear for such proceedings. On this latter issue, the Conferees 
expect the Attorney General to establish an efficient and trustworthy system to ensure 
that communications between INS and aliens subject to deportation are accurately 
recorded and that they reflect whether counsel has filed notice of appearance on behalf 
of the alien and, if so, whether such notice has become stale through the passage of 
time or has been withdrawn. Additionally, the conferees expect that in determining 
whether an alien’s failure to appear was justifiable the Attorney General will look at 
the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the alien could not reasonably 
have been expected to appear. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 76. See INA § 240(e)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(1). 
 77. Id. 
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but such examples are not meant to be exhaustive.78 Thus, the only 
requirements established by the INA for exceptional circumstances 
are that the reasons for the failure to appear be “compelling” and 
“beyond the control of the alien.”  
This then leads to the question of what qualifies as a “compelling” 
failure to appear. Clearly, Congress’s intent was to make the standard 
warranting reopening of in absentia orders more stringent.79 At the 
same time, however, a “compelling” failure to appear must be 
interpreted in such a way as to not violate the due process rights of 
the noncitizen.80 
The exceptional circumstances provision is important for a 
number of reasons, including its due process implications, that the 
drafters of the INA undoubtedly had in mind. With the Immigration 
Act of 1990, Congress had dual concerns regarding immigration. As 
the “most important immigration statute in many years,”81 the 
Immigration Act of 1990 addressed and rejected the hostility that 
characterized the earlier McCarran-Walter Act of 1952,82 while 
simultaneously toughening various substantive grounds, including the 
procedure regarding removal.83 The House of Representatives, in 
passing this Act, further expressed that among its purposes was a 
desire to ease current immigration law restrictions that (1) hinder 
reunification of nuclear families, (2) impose barriers to immigration 
on nationals of countries that have served as traditional sources of 
immigration to the United States, and (3) severely limit the number of 
highly skilled or otherwise needed foreign-born workers who may 
become lawful permanent residents.84 
 
 78. Id. These examples include “serious illness of the alien” and “death of a spouse, child 
or parent of the alien,” but not “less compelling circumstances.” Id.  
 79. This is especially true given the previous standard had been that the noncitizen was 
only required to show “reasonable cause” for his or her failure to appear. Georcely v. Ashcroft, 
375 F.3d 45, 50 n.4 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 865 F.2d 328, 333 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989); Tang v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1192, 1194 n.3, 1195 n.4 (10th Cir. 2003)). 
 80. See supra note 25 and accompanying text and Part II.C; infra note 106 and 
accompanying text. 
 81. 1 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN, AND STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, 
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.04[11][b]2-38 (2004). 
 82. Id. 
 83. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 22 (Foundation Press ed., 
4th ed. 2005). 
 84. H.R. REP. NO. 101-723, pt. 1, at 31 (1990). 
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Furthermore, Congress expressed its intent to “repeal[] and 
moderniz[e] outdated laws” and to “eas[e] unintended or harmful 
consequences” of other provisions of the INA as previously 
enacted.85 
The Immigration Act of 1990 sought to continue to protect the 
due process rights of aliens in removal proceedings. Noncitizens in 
the United States had long been protected by the Due Process 
Clause.86 Yet the constitutional protection extended to noncitizens is 
not as complete as the protection received by U.S. citizens.87 
Furthermore, the freedom and protection offered by the Constitution 
was recognized more fully by prior versions of the INA.88 
 
 85. Id. at 32. Furthermore, the Presidential signing statement expressed a number of goals 
intended to be accomplished by this Act revising the INA. According to then-President Bush, 
“Immigration reform began in 1986 with an effort to close the ‘back door’ on illegal 
immigration through enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA).” The 
Immigration Act of 1990 was seen as “open[ing] the ‘front door’ to increased legal 
immigration” while providing the “needed enforcement authority” to do so. 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N 
6801-1. Additionally, Bush praised the legislation for meeting “several objectives of this 
Administration’s domestic policy agenda” including “cultivation of a more competitive 
economy, support for the family as the essential unit of society, and swift and effective 
punishment for drug-related and other violent crime.” Id. 
 86. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 365 (1886); 
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903); 
United States ex rel Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 
(1945); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). 
 87. Indeed, if the same protections were available to both citizens and noncitizens, 
noncitizens would not be subject to removal proceedings in the first place; the argument for 
such a change, however, is not herein advanced. 
 For a discussion of the extent to which the Due Process clause applies to noncitizens in 
other types of proceedings, see Clarence E. Zachery, Jr. The Alien Terrorist Removal 
Procedures: Removing the Enemy Among Us Or Becoming the Enemy From Within?, 9 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 291, 298 (1995). See also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78–79 (1976) (“The fact 
that all persons, aliens and citizens alike, are protected by the Due Process Clause does not lead 
to the further conclusion that all aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship or, 
indeed, to the conclusion that all aliens must be placed in a single homogeneous legal 
classification. For a host of constitutional and statutory provisions rest on the premise that a 
legitimate distinction between citizens and aliens may justify attributes and benefits for one 
class not afforded to the other; and the class of aliens is itself a heterogeneous multitude of 
persons with a wide-ranging variety of ties to this country.”). 
 88. See INA § 242(a)(2)(A),(B),(C), imposing limits on judicial review of orders of 
removal. In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act [hereinafter IIRIRA], which enacted the above-mentioned sections of the 
INA. IIRIRA focused on the swift removal of undocumented immigrants, and stripped the 
federal courts of jurisdiction to review several categories of deportation orders. Previous to the 
enactment of IIRIRA, an administratively final order of removal could be judicially reviewed as 
a general rule by petition for review in the courts of appeals. However, IIRIRA barred judicial 
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Nonetheless, constitutional due process, including the right to a full 
and fair hearing, continues to be the right of aliens in removal 
proceedings, even, or perhaps especially, when they are faced with 
an in absentia order of removal. 89 
As it currently stands, the INA and surrounding regulations have 
made it increasingly difficult for the noncitizen to seek any remedy 
after entry of an in absentia order of removal, particularly if the 
person actually is removed pursuant to such order. In absentia orders 
of removal are reviewable only on the issues of the adequacy of 
notice, the reasons for the person’s absence, and deportability.90 
Furthermore, if a final order of removal is entered in absentia against 
a noncitizen due to failure to attend a removal proceeding (with the 
sole exception for failures due to exceptional circumstances), that 
person becomes ineligible for relief until ten years after the final 
 
review of almost the entire category of crime-related removal grounds. INA § 242(a)(2)(C), 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). IIRIRA also acted to preclude judicial review of most discretionary 
decisions. INA § 242(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). Furthermore, IIRIRA’s enactment 
caused a prohibition on a number of other judicial remedies. INA § 242(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(A) (barring judicial review of orders of expedited removal); Id. § 1252(g) (barring 
review of prosecutorial discretion to institute removal proceedings); id. § 1252(f)(1) (barring 
class actions seeking injunctive relief). Note also that the prefatory exception before the 
substantial elements of each of these subsections (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law 
(statutory or nonstatutory) including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code . . . ) was 
added by the REAL ID Act of 2005. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on 
Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 380–84 (2006); LEGOMSKY, supra note 83, at 23. 
However, due process rights of aliens upon judicial review have been conserved, although to a 
much more limited extent by INA § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (“Nothing in 
subparagraph (B) or (c), or in any other provision of this Act (other than this section) which 
limits or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional 
claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of 
appeals in accordance with this section”).  
 89. INA § 240(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4) describes the current state of the law 
regarding aliens’ rights in removal proceedings. That section states that the noncitizen 
shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against the alien, to 
present evidence on the alien’s own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented 
by the Government but these rights shall not entitle the alien to examine such national 
security information as the Government may proffer in opposition to the alien’s 
admission to the United States or to an application by the alien for discretionary relief 
under this Act. 
Id. § 240(b)(4)(B). 
 90. INA § 240(b)(5)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(D). Thus, eligibility for discretionary 
relief, including cancellation of removal and adjustment of status under § 240A (among the 
most common issues presented in petitions for review), would not be subject to judicial review. 
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order of removal is entered.91 Thus, noncitizens who are ordered 
removed in absentia suffer adverse consequences beyond the 
removal order itself.92 
Because of these severe, adverse results from in absentia orders, 
the “exceptional circumstances” exception is key in ensuring that 
noncitizens in such proceedings are given all the rights that are due to 
them. Foremost among such rights is that of procedural due process, 
which must be taken into consideration when motions to reopen are 
before the BIA, and subsequently, if denied by the BIA, in the 
judicial review process. 
The “totality of the circumstances” approach advocated by the 
BIA93 provides a useful means of analyzing “exceptional 
circumstances” claims, although the factors to be considered may 
vary between the BIA and the various courts of appeals. There is a 
need for clarification here, especially when considering the due 
process implications in such cases.  
Furthermore, using due process to interpret exceptional 
circumstances may help elaborate a more uniform approach to the 
three categories of such circumstances.94 Particularly in regard to the 
second category, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, due 
process should be crucial to interpreting the Lozada factors, so that 
the alien is not deprived of a full and fair hearing due to an 
unfortunate choice of counsel.95 In the context of the third category 
(exceptional circumstances argued due to tardiness), the distinction 
between circumstances which are unforeseeable and those which are 
merely unforeseen has played, and will likely continue to play, an 
important role. The immigration judges and the BIA will need to 
focus more upon circumstances beyond the control of the alien in 
order to come to a consensus and uniform rule that is aligned with 
congressional intent behind these provisions of the INA. 
The importance of developing a uniform rule of interpretation of 
“exceptional circumstances” is likely to be felt most, however, in 
 
 91. INA § 240(b)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(7). 
 92. LEGOMSKY, supra note 83, at 839. 
 93. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 94. See supra Part II.B. 
 95. See supra notes 56–60 and accompanying text; infra note 107 and accompanying text. 
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claims that do not squarely fit into any of the above-enumerated 
categories. In all three of the above-discussed categories, elaboration 
on the meaning of “totality of the circumstances,” determinations of 
credibility, actual notice of the hearing, and a real opportunity to be 
heard become increasingly important. Furthermore, the various 
factors elaborated by the BIA and the courts of appeals will 
inevitably be crucial in determining whether the noncitizen’s due 
process rights have been violated.  
Certainly, since September 11, 2001, national security has become 
key in the ways in which legislators have considered immigration 
reform as well as in the minds of the public discussing immigration.96 
Those concerned with both problems of national security and more 
generally of immigrants arriving and staying in the country illegally 
may have three major responses to the arguments advanced here. 
 
 96. Following the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the United States Congress has passed 
several acts revising the INA in efforts to step up national security in the immigration context. 
In the past approximately five years, five major bills dealing with immigration and national 
security have been enacted. See USA PATRIOT Act, 115 Stat. 272 (enacted Oct. 26, 2001), 
EBSVERA, 116 Stat. 543 (enacted May 2002), the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 
2135 (HSA), the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 118 Stat. 3638, 
and the REAL ID Act of 2005 (enacted May 15, 2005). Among other provisions, these bills 
have increased funding for border patrol, heightened scrutiny of passports and visas and thus 
caused delays in the visa process, prohibited the issuance of nonimmigrant visas to noncitizens 
“from a country that is a state sponsor of international terrorism” without waiver from the 
Secretary of State and Attorney General (see EBSVERA § 306(a)), and nearly eliminated 
procedural rights of noncitizens the government for whatever reason suspects to be a terrorist. 
See, e.g., LEGOMSKY, supra note 83, at 843–914. For more on the detention and disappearing 
procedural rights of noncitizens in the context of national security, see David Cole, In Aid of 
Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003 (2002); Stephen 
H. Legomsky, The Ethnic and Religious Profiling of Noncitizens: National Security and 
International Human Rights, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 161 (2005); Natsu Taylor Saito, Will 
Force Trump Legality After September 11? American Jurisprudence Confronts the Rule of Law, 
17 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 1 (2002); Charles D. Weisselberg, The Detention and Treatment of Aliens 
Three Years After September 11: A New New World?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 815 (2005). See 
also David Cole, Enemy Aliens-Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on 
Terrorism (2003); Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 
2003); 68 Fed. Reg. 4364–67, adding 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 (Jan. 29, 2003) (regulation preventing 
nonfederal detention facilities from releasing information relating to their immigration 
detainees). Cf. Jan C. Ting, Unobjectionable But Insufficient—Federal Initiatives in Response 
to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1145 (2002) (arguing that 28 C.F.R. 
§ 501.3 (2004), which authorizes monitoring the conversations between detained immigrants 
and their attorneys where the Attorney General suspects the immigrant to be a terrorist, is 
justified by the government’s interest in preventing the deaths of innocent civilians that could 
be caused by a future terrorist attack). 
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First, if noncitizens are here illegally, they should not be granted the 
same rights as citizens (or of noncitizens who are legally present). 
Secondly, the GAO report to which the Immigration Act of 1990 was 
a response97 made it clear that lack of appearance for immigration 
hearings had been a significant problem, and the enactment of the 
Immigration Act of 1990 was merely a valid solution to a clear 
problem in the immigration laws as they stood at that time. Finally, 
opponents to broader interpretation of the immigration laws may 
argue that if an alien fails to appear for a deportation hearing, he or 
she has waived that right and should not be able to assert that his or 
her due process rights were violated unless he or she falls into one of 
the exceptions set forth by the specific language of the INA. As part 
of this, it might be argued that the “exceptional circumstances” 
provision has not in fact been interpreted so narrowly as to work a 
deprivation of rights. Rather, along this line of argument, the high 
standard has been correctly applied so as to enable the BIA to 
distinguish between those who legitimately missed their hearing due 
to circumstances beyond their control and those who voluntarily 
chose not to appear. 
First, as discussed above, the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution guarantees all persons, not only citizens, the right 
to a full and fair hearing.98 Among few places could the abridgment 
of this right be more severe than in the context of a removal 
proceeding.99 
In response to the second argument, the GAO report further 
explained that the problem of aliens not arriving for their removal 
hearings was largely due to a failure on the part of the INS to provide 
 
 97. See supra notes 8–9 and 12–13 accompanying text. 
 98. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text; see also Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 
344 U.S. 590, 596–97 n.5 (1953) (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945)) 
(“[O]nce an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes invested with the rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our borders. Such rights include those 
protected by the First and the Fifth Amendments and by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. None of these provisions acknowledges any distinction between 
citizens and resident aliens. They extend their inalienable privileges to all ‘persons’ and guard 
against any encroachment on those rights by federal or state authority.”) (emphasis added).  
 99. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); Matter of Exilus, 18 I.&N. Dec. 276, 
278 (B.I.A. 1982); Dobrota v. INS, 311 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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adequate notice of the hearing to the respondent.100 Read in this 
context, the revisions in the Immigration Act of 1990 would appear to 
be aimed at ensuring that DHS properly notifies noncitizens of the 
proceedings instituted against them to minimize the number of 
missed hearings in this manner.101 Furthermore, subsequent GAO 
reports suggest that the harsher provisions in the Immigration Act of 
1990 have not accomplished what they sought to. For instance, 
according to one report, the number of in absentia cases increased by 
approximately 80% between 2004 and 2005, from roughly 70,000 
cases in 2004 to roughly 126,000 in 2005.102 A different report 
addresses the unreliability of address information DHS maintains on 
noncitizens, and concludes lack of publicity about its requirements as 
well as inadequate processing procedures help to explain this 
unreliability.103 Since DHS is thus unable to maintain accurate 
records of domicile for noncitizens in removal proceedings, this 
suggests that the same problem exists today as in 1989 – namely, that 
DHS continues to fail to properly notify individuals of the procedures 
to be followed, leading to an increased number of missed hearings. 
Furthermore, in determining the reason for a failure to appear at a 
removal hearing, it is necessary to look beyond the adequacy of 
notice; this is the reason the “exceptional circumstances” provision is 
necessary.104 
Third and finally, if properly interpreted by careful, case-by-case 
analysis, full effect may be given to the text of INA § 240, such that 
immigration judges and the BIA will be able to distinguish between 
voluntary absence from removal proceedings and cases involving 
circumstances truly beyond the control of the noncitizen. This is not 
to say that the BIA has failed to undertake careful, case-by-case 
 
 100. Supra note 8. 
 101. See infra note 102. 
 102. GAO, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW: CASELOAD PERFORMANCE 
REPORTING NEEDS IMPROVEMENT GAO-06-771, 13 (Sept. 2006), http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d06771.pdf. That report further states that there had been an increase in the number 
of DHS charging documents that did not have the address of the immigrant, which in part led to 
this drastic increase in the number of in absentia decisions from 2004 to 2005. Id. at n.23. 
 103. GAO, HOMELAND SECURITY: INS CANNOT LOCATE MANY ALIENS BECAUSE IT 
LACKS RELIABLE ADDRESS INFORMATION GAO-03-188, 16 (Nov. 2002), http://www.gao.gov/ 
htext/d03188.html. 
 104. See supra note 34. 
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analysis to date; merely that the interpretation to date has left many 
cases where judgments are seemingly inconsistent. Therefore, the 
BIA and the courts of appeal need to come to agreement on a uniform 
means of approaching cases involving exceptional circumstances. 
IV. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? IN SEARCH OF UNIFORMITY 
AND PROTECTION OF DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
The need for uniformity among the interpretations of immigration 
judges, the BIA, and the courts of appeals is apparent. Without any 
word from the Supreme Court on the proper interpretation, it seems 
likely that for now the circuit courts will have the final say in these 
matters. Currently, it is crucial that the immigration judges and the 
BIA undertake a careful analysis, considering the unique 
circumstances in each case, in a manner that is consistent with the 
analysis undertaken in such cases as Kaweesa and Nazarova, as well 
as with the “totality of the circumstances” approach advocated by the 
BIA.  
In order to successfully protect the due process rights of 
noncitizens in such proceedings, it is necessary for the BIA to come 
to a uniform conclusion as to how to settle matters. A broadening of 
the factors to be considered in the totality of the circumstances 
approach, as per the suggestion of various courts of appeals, should 
not be overlooked by the BIA. This may become especially important 
as there are likely to be increasing numbers of cases that do not easily 
fit into the three-prong framework enumerated above.105 
Additionally, the BIA should not be concerned that this may 
erroneously enable certain noncitizens who voluntarily chose not to 
appear to have their cases reconsidered, as the credibility 
determinations of the immigration judges will prevent such errors 
from occurring. 
The close examination of due process rights should be particularly 
crucial in the context of exceptional circumstance claims based upon 
ineffective assistance of counsel.106 Although the Lozada factors are 
quite helpful as guidelines to determining whether exceptional 
 
 105. See supra Part II.B. 
 106. See supra notes 56–60 and accompanying text. 
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circumstances exist warranting reopening of in absentia orders of 
removal, they should not be interpreted in such a way as to infringe 
upon the noncitizen’s right to a full and fair hearing. This is 
especially true in a context where the failure of the noncitizen to 
appear at his or her hearing is entirely beyond his or her control, and 
is due entirely to the incompetence of his or her chosen counsel. At a 
minimum, both the BIA and the circuit courts (should the BIA abuse 
its discretion) should make it standard practice to stay orders of 
removal and remand such cases if there is reason to believe that the 
Lozada requirements could be met.107 Arguably, more could be 
required in interpreting Lozada, as the third condition (filing a bar 
claim) has occasionally led to a deprivation of due process rights or 
delays in the processing of valid claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.108 Allowing noncitizens to pursue their claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel with this requirement lessened might help to 
ensure that the noncitizen is not deprived of a full and fair hearing 
simply because her counsel has been inadequate. This is even more 
true where the noncitizen who has been assisted by inadequate 
counsel is unlikely to know of his or her duty under Lozada to report 
such a claim other than in court. Worries about fraud due to attorneys 
and clients collaborating to raise ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims could further be mitigated by requiring such claims to be 
inadmissible where the same counsel is arguing the claim as the 
client is claiming was ineffective.  
Additionally, as it requires with other types of exceptional 
circumstance claims, the BIA can mitigate the likelihood of such 
fraud by requiring affidavits supporting the claim from the noncitizen 
as well as others with knowledge of the noncitizen’s claim.109 Rather 
than increasing fraud, this would have the effect of increasing 
 
 107. See, e.g., Dominguez-Capistran v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 876, 878–79 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(staying order of removal ninety days to afford respondent an opportunity to file a motion to 
reopen where she had offered evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel, because court was 
“troubled by the manner in which [respondent’s attorney] has handled this case”).  
 108. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 109. See, e.g., Matter of J-P-, 22 I.&N. Dec. 33 (B.I.A. 1998), Matter of B-A-S-, 22 I.&N. 
Dec. 57 (B.I.A. 1998) (requiring for claims of “serious illness” that the noncitizen submit 
affidavits from medical personnel, family and/or friends with knowledge of the noncitizen’s 
illness, and/or affidavits from an employer attesting to the noncitizen’s absence from work due 
to such illness). 
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accountability for lawyers for their actions with respect to removal 
proceedings. Essentially, exceptional circumstances must be 
interpreted so that innocent noncitizens are not deprived of their 
constitutional rights while their attorneys are permitted. without 
reprimand, to continue to make the same mistakes leading to removal 
of noncitizens with valid claims. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Little guidance is provided by the INA as to the interpretation of 
the term “exceptional circumstances” with regard to removal 
proceedings. This has resulted in divergent interpretations at the BIA 
level and at the circuit court level as well, leading to a deprivation of 
constitutionally provided due process in the cases of numerous aliens 
who have had orders of removal entered against them in absentia. In 
a context where immigration actions are becoming more like criminal 
than civil proceedings, it is crucial that aliens’ right to due process be 
protected wherever and as much as possible. This will only be fully 
accomplished in the context of these motions to reopen in absentia 
orders of removal upon uniform interpretation of “exceptional 
circumstances.” Such an interpretation will examine the extent to 
which the circumstances were “compelling” and beyond the 
noncitizen’s control. Furthermore, this type of examination in every 
instance must include a “totality of the circumstances” approach, 
evidenced by a true weighing of the government’s interest against the 
hardship on the noncitizen of removal takes place, as well as a focus 
upon the due process rights of noncitizens to a full and fair hearing in 
such proceedings. 
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